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CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION AND RESEARCH QUESTION 
1.1 Introduction  
 
According to Nortje, the point of departure in South African law is that there is generally no duty of 
disclosure in the pre-contractual phase apart from a few exceptions.1 She seems to be of the view that 
there is still uncertainty regarding the circumstances and factors which would justify the imposition of 
such duty but claims that its scope has expanded significantly over the last century.2  
 
Apart from special relationships of trust and influence, and contracts uberrimae fidei, non-disclosure of 
material information during contract negotiations does not, generally speaking, constitute a fraudulent 
act, but it may be such in three instances.3 
 
The three situations where silence will give rise to an action based on non-disclosure, and in certain 
circumstances amount to a representation, were identified in the Orban case.4 A fraudulent non-
disclosure takes place when a person is under a duty to disclose to another and fails to do so.5 The three 
situations are: 
(i) active concealment;6 
(ii) designed concealment;7 and 
(iii) simple non-disclosure.8 
 
Active concealment includes using tactics to hide the defects of the thing being sold in order to prevent 
the other party from learning a material fact about it or by making true statements but keeping silent 
about certain things which (if they were to be disclosed) would alter the whole effect of the statement 
(half-truths in essence) or allowing a party to proceed to contract on an erroneous belief to which the 
other party’s acts have contributed.9 
 
Designed concealment is where surrounding circumstances necessitates a duty to disclose.10 Here we 
are dealing with true passivity or silence but accompanied by a state of mind amounting to dolus. 
Although concealment does not have to be deliberate or for the purpose of deception, the implication is 
                                                   
1 Nortje “Pre-contractual duties of disclosure in the South African common law (part 1)” 2015 TSAR 347. 
2 n 1 above. 
3 Millner “Fraudulent non-disclosure” 1957 SALJ 157 200. 
4 Orban v Stead 1978 2 SA 713 (W). 
5 n 3 above. 
6 n 1 above. 
7 n 1 above. 
8 n 1 above. 
9 n 1 above 
10 n 3 above. 
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generally there.1 In this instance a party deliberately refrains to disclose facts the other party is not aware 
of.2 
 
Simple non-disclosure raises the issue as to whether the seller may be held to be fraudulent, whatever 
his state of mind, if he fails to disclose to the buyer some material fact concerning the res of which he 
is aware and the buyer is ignorant. This would mean that innocent non-disclosure attributable to the 
seller’s inadvertence would be just as much a fraud on the buyer as a non-disclosure deliberately 
designed to mislead him.3 In this case, the contracting party keeps silent without any fraudulent intent.4 
 
In all three scenarios the conduct must be accompanied by dolus, a dishonest intent, in order for it to be 
fraudulent and in the third case of simple non-disclosure (which is limited to aedilitian defects in 
contracts of sale) once it is proven that a party had knowledge, dolus is conclusively presumed.5 This 
seems to indicate that the non-statement of a material fact is fraudulent if it is accompanied by a 
dishonest intent.6 
 
One would think that a duty of disclosure goes without saying irrespective whether the information is 
material or not, however this does not appear to be the case as will be illustrated by this dissertation.  
1.2 Research Question 
 
The research question that will be answered in this dissertation is whether a party can be held liable for 
failing to disclose material facts within his knowledge to another party during contract negotiations and 
if such liability can be exempted contractually.  
1.3 Research Objective 
 
The aim of this mini-dissertation is threefold, firstly to determine the ambit of the duty of disclosure of 
material facts in a pre-contractual context (specifically with regards to commercial agreements 
concluded in South Africa). Secondly, to determine the extent to which liability may arise if this duty 
is breached and lastly, to establish if it is feasible and valid to exempt liability for a breach of this duty 
and possible remedies available to a party in those circumstances.  
 
 
                                                   
1 Millner “Fraudulent non-disclosure” 1957 SALJ 157 200. 
2 Cupido Misrepresentation by non-disclosure in South African law (2013 thesis SA) 14. 
3 n 1 above. 
4 n 1 above. 
5 n 1 above. 
6 n 1 above. 
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1.4 Research Methodology 
 
The method of research this study will use is a literature review (doctrinal research) and consists of data 
collected from case law, journals and other academic writings. This methodology is appropriate as the 
dissertation will analyse a few cases by summarising the facts and conclusions of each case. 
Furthermore, it will identify the common law duties of disclosure and determine if it is possible to 
disclaim liability if this duty is breached and what the possible remedies are. In conclusion, the research 
will comment on the aspects discussed in this dissertation. 
 
1.5 Proposed Chapter Outline 
 
This study is divided into four sections and commences with an introduction of the topic, the problem 
statement and the research question. Chapter two summarises some case law and provides insight into 
the ambit of the duty of disclosure. It also identifies the various forms of liability that could arise if this 
duty is breached and briefly discusses exemption of liability and possible remedies. The last chapter 
contains a final opinion on the duty of disclosure.  
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CHAPTER 2 
THE SCOPE OF THE DUTY OF DISCLOSURE 
 
2.1 Introduction 
 
This chapter analyses the scope of the duty of disclosure by canvassing a number of case law and 
identifying the various forms of liability that could arise if this duty is breached. Consideration is also 
given as to whether it is possible to exempt liability for failing to disclose material facts and possible 
remedies available in the event of a breach. 
 
Spencer Bower distinguishes between five categories of transactions and relations which involve a duty 
of disclosure. The first relates to negotiating for contracts of certain kinds (such as contracts of 
insurance, sale, releases, suretyships and compromises). In this case one party must, from the nature of 
the contemplated transaction, be aware of facts unknown to the other party (and for which the latter 
relies on the good faith of the former to disclose) in order for the latter to determine if he wants to enter 
into the contract on the terms proposed.1 The one party is, therefore, under a duty from the moment the 
contract is concluded to disclose all material facts which are within his actual or presumptive 
knowledge, to the other.2 The second is where a relation has already been established, whether by 
conduct, contract or circumstances, which implies a fiduciary bond between the parties, and a 
consequent duty on the party in whom confidence is placed to observe good faith towards the party 
reposing that confidence, when entering into any transaction.3 The third consists of all those relations 
in which there is either presumed in law, or proved in fact, to have existed on the one side supremacy 
and, on the other, subjection in which the will of the one party is dominant and the will of the other is 
servient.4 The fourth includes all cases of a positive statutory duty of disclosure, for the violation of 
which a party aggrieved has a civil remedy.5 The last category consists of cases in which a person is 
injuriously affected by, and has a right of complaint and relief in respect of another person’s breach of 
a duty of disclosure owed by him to the court, the state or a class of third persons, and not, except 
indirectly, to the party complaining.6 
 
2.2 Statutory Disclosures 
 
Although this study does not include a discussion on statutory duties of disclosure it is of some interest 
to note that there are instances where this duty is regulated by statute. The Policyholder Protection rules 
                                                   
1 Spencer Bower The law relating to actionable non-disclosure (1915) 50. 
2 n 1 above. 
3 n 1 above. 
4 n 1 above. 
5 n 1 above. 
6 n 1 above. 
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has dedicated an entire section to this duty and has listed the circumstances under which it is mandatory.1 
The resultant impact for non-compliance of this duty is that an insurance claim could be repudiated by 
the insurer if the non-disclosure is likely to have materially affected the assessment of the risk 
underwritten by the insurer. Another example is the Companies Act 71 of 2008 which places an 
obligation on a director to make full disclosure of any interest he may have in a contract and to which 
the company is also a party.2 Non-disclosure could result in the director being held personally liable if 
the transaction in which he has a conflict is not ratified by the shareholders. It could also render the 
contract voidable at the instance of the company.3 
 
2.3 Fraudulent and/or negligent non-disclosure  
 
2.3.1 Cloete v Smithfield Hotel4 
 
In casu, the plaintiff’s claim was based inter alia on a fraudulent and negligent non-disclosure of facts 
and he sought damages from the defendant as a result thereof. The parties entered into a contract for the 
purchase of immovable property on which a hotel (the Smithfield hotel) was situated. The plaintiff 
averred that the defendant was aware of the defects in the merx and withheld this information from him. 
The defects complained of was that the hotel’s sewerage system was not working properly in that, (a) 
it was linked to a septic tank situated on the adjoining municipal property, (b) the right to use the septic 
tank could be withdrawn by the municipality at any time, the (c) municipality revoked this right prior 
to the conclusion of the sale and (d) the sewerage water could not be pumped out without creating a 
stench. The plaintiff’s claim was based on seven causes of action, namely (a) fraudulent 
misrepresentation, (b) negligent misrepresentation, (c) innocent misrepresentation, (d) fraudulent non-
disclosure, (e) negligent non-disclosure, (f) latent defects and (g) an implied term that the property was 
fully equipped for the purpose of conducting a hotel business on it.5 
 
Horwitz J stated that the defendant’s duty to disclose the facts and the breach of that duty by concealing 
the facts could be explained by reference to the decision accepted in Trotman v Edwick:6 
 
“This was clearly no fresh averment of fraudulent misrepresentation by silence. Its intent was to allege that, having 
made a certain impression upon the mind of the plaintiff by fraudulent misrepresentation, they did not thereafter and 
before the sale disabuse his mind; consequently, the effect of the misrepresentation continued to operate until the 
                                                   
1 Issued under the Short-Term Insurance Act 53 of 1998 and the Long-term Insurance Act 52 of 1998. 
2 Ndebele No conflict duty of company directors (2014 thesis SA) 21. 
3 n 2 above. 
4 Cloete v Smithfield Hotel (Pty) Ltd 1955 2 SA 337 (O). 
5 n 4 above. 
6 Trotman v Edwick 1951 1 SA 443 (A). This case was a classic example of active concealment. 
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deed of sale was signed. It furnishes a link in the causal chain between the alleged false representations and the 
conclusion of the sale.”1 
 
Horwitz J also considered and accepted the statements of Spencer Bower in that a person who has been 
misled needs to allege and prove the following in order to institute an action for rescission of a contract 
based on non-disclosure:2 
 
(i) that the other party was under a duty to disclose to him the particular fact of which non-
disclosure is alleged;3 
 
(ii) that the alleged undisclosed fact was a material fact at the relevant date;4 
 
(iii) that the party charged did not disclose to the party complaining the alleged undisclosed fact at 
the time when such party was under a duty to do so;5 
 
(iv) that the party charged had knowledge of the alleged undisclosed fact at the time when it was 
such party’s duty to disclose it;6 and 
 
(v) that the party complaining had no such knowledge at the material date.7 
 
Concluding his ruling, Horwitz J held that: 
 
“where the seller is aware that the goods have a hidden defect and he does not inform the buyer, then the matter is 
equal to a representation followed by a failure on the part of the seller to rectify the false impression created with 
the buyer and that is fraud. In such a case, the silence would create a false impression and should then be regarded 
as a misrepresentation. Where, however, the case does not incorporate any such guarantee against default, which 
precedes the representation, then mere silence would give no right of action unless the concealment of a material 
fact is deliberate and accompanied by an intention on the part of the seller to deceive the buyer and thus move the 
buyer to enter into the contract where, to the seller's knowledge, he would not have concluded a contract if he had 
knowledge of the true facts”.8 
 
The defendant thus had a duty to disclose to the plaintiff the fact that the municipality withdrew the 
right to use the septic tank (based on requirement (i) of Spencer Bower listed above).9 Horwitz J 
regarded the revocation of the right as a latent defect against which the defendant warranted the plaintiff 
                                                   
1 Cloete v Smithfield Hotel (Pty) Ltd 1955 2 SA 337 (O). 
2 n 1 above. 
3 n 1 above.  
4 n 1 above. 
5 n 1 above. 
6 n 1 above. 
7 n 1 above. 
8 n 1 above. 
9 n 1 above. 
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tacitly. If these considerations cannot be justified, and if the intention to deceive must also be proved 
by the plaintiff then in these circumstances the necessary information exists according to which it can 
be concluded that the plaintiff negotiated with the defendant in connection with a hotel with a sewer 
system which is operational and that the defendant should also have reasonably inferred, from the 
plaintiff’s previous threat to terminate further negotiations because the furniture of relatively little value 
would not be included in the proposed sale, the plaintiff would not have concluded the sale if he 
discovered that the right had been withdrawn, and that this material fact was concealed in order to 
ensure that the agreement is concluded (requirements (ii) and (iii) of Spencer Bower, as noted above is 
fulfilled here). Damages were granted in favour of the plaintiff for the amount by which his patrimony 
was diminished as a result of the wrongful act of the defendant.1 
 
2.3.2 Speight v Glass2 
 
In casu, the plaintiff sought to have a contract for the sale and purchase of shares and loan accounts in 
a company that owned a hotel in the South Coast of Natal rescinded on the basis that the defendants 
were aware, at the time the contract was entered into, that the council had approved the proposed 
construction of a public road through the middle of the hotel and that they failed to disclose this 
(material) fact to the plaintiff.3 Although the plaintiff did not expressly allege fraudulent non-disclosure 
the issue was raised in his opening arguments and the case was based on two alternative propositions, 
namely: 
 
(i) the defendants were guilty of fraud in withholding information of a material fact and that it 
justified rescission of the contract;4  
 
(ii) even if fraud was not proven, the plaintiff was entitled to rescission because the defendants had 
knowledge, at the date of the sale, of a material fact of which the plaintiff was ignorant and of 
which it was their duty to disclose to the plaintiff before entering into the contract, had failed 
to do so.5 
 
In support of the argument in (ii) above, the plaintiff’s attorney referred to Spencer Bower’s statement 
regarding the governing proposition or rule in respect of the duty of disclosure in contracts uberrimae 
fidei: 
“Where two parties are negotiating with reference to a contemplated contract of the above description, the party who 
has the private or special knowledge must disclose … to the party who, from the nature of the case, must necessarily 
                                                   
1 Cloete v Smithfield Hotel (Pty) Ltd 1955 2 SA 337 (O). 
2 Speight v Glass 1961 1 SA 779 (D). 
3 n 2 above.  
4 n 2 above. 
5 n 2 above. 
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depend upon him for information and instruction, all such facts as are … to the particular contract or transaction, 
and are within his actual or presumed knowledge …, except such as the law presumes, and he, therefore, has a right 
to presume, that the other party is acquainted with, or such as he is in a position to prove by evidence that the other 
party was cognisant of in fact.”1 
 
Contracts of the above description (as referred to in the quote above) are those contracts in the 
negotiation for which one of the parties must, from the nature of the transaction, have either actual or 
presumptive knowledge of circumstances which ordinarily are not within the actual or presumptive 
knowledge of the other party, and the knowledge of which is, or may be, of importance to that other 
party to enable him to determine if he wants to enter into the proposed contract or not.2 
 
Fannin J was of the view that the passages cited by the plaintiff’s attorney cannot be regarded as a 
reliable guide to South African law and confirmed that there is no general duty in our law upon 
contracting parties to disclose to each other any fact or circumstance known to them which may 
influence the mind of the other party in deciding whether to conclude a contract.3 She found that there 
is authority in South African law that if a seller knows of the existence of a defect in the thing sold but 
deliberately refrains from disclosing it to the buyer; he is guilty of fraud, justifying the cancellation of 
the contract by the buyer who is not aware.4 She further stated that a duty to disclose can only exist 
where a seller knows of the buyer’s ignorance or must know of it because the facts are, to such party’s 
knowledge, accessible only to himself.5 It is difficult to conceive of the duty of non-disclosure being 
unaccompanied by a fraudulent intent.6 Furthermore, if the duty exists a mere breach of it, even if it can 
found an action, cannot amount to fraud because the very essence of fraud is a guilty state of mind.7 
She could not see how a person can be deemed to be found guilty of fraud.8 In conclusion, she doubted 
that the existence of the proposal can be regarded as something within the “exclusive and private 
knowledge” of the defendants having regard to the public nature of its adoption by the local authority 
and found that there are no circumstances which would convert the silence of the defendants into a 
representation, either innocent or fraudulent, that there was in existence no such proposal.9 The plaintiff 
failed to prove that a duty to disclose the proposal rested on the defendants or that he was entitled to 
redhibitory relief.10 
 
 
 
                                                   
1 Speight v Glass 1961 1 SA 779 (D). 
2 n 1 above. 
3 n 1 above. 
4 n 1 above. 
5 n 1 above 
6 n 1 above 
7 n 1 above 
8 n 1 above. 
9 n 1 above. 
10 n 1 above. 
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2.3.3 Orban v Stead1 
 
In this matter the applicant was interested in purchasing a property (to be sold in execution), known as 
erf 153, Randpark Ridge and adjacent to erf 163, Randpark Ridge, for the purpose of using the house 
on the property as a nursery school for his daughters after making some alterations and extensions to 
the property.2 It later transpired (municipal officials informed the applicant) that the proposed 
extensions and alternation were not possible because the property was not large enough and the land 
between the stream and the beginning of the garden constituted erf 163 which was leased to the 
respondents by the municipality and they were obliged to use it for gardening purposes only.3 The 
applicant sought an interim interdict preventing transfer and an order declaring that he was entitled to 
cancel the sale agreement (which was signed by the seller’s wife, duly authorised thereto) as he 
contended that the respondents were aware that erf 163 was leased and they were under a duty to 
disclose the boundary line of erf 153 to the applicant, thereby preventing the possibility of creating a 
misunderstanding on his part because both properties were fenced in as if they were one property.4 The 
court held that the applicant’s desire to assist his daughters to establish a nursery, which was not 
communicated to the respondents, was irrelevant.5 One of the difficulties was that the agreement 
contained a voetstoots clause which stipulated that the property was sold voetstoots and in the condition 
“it now lies”.6 The parties acknowledged that the agreement constituted the entire agreement between 
them and that no conditions, stipulations, warranties or representations other than those contained in 
the agreement had been made by either party.7 On the assumption that this left the applicant with no 
option he conceded that his claim was based on fraudulent non-disclosure.8 It is interesting to note that 
at no stage during the sale did the respondents meet or directly communicate with the applicant and the 
latter did not disclose his reasons for buying the property to the respondents.9  
 
King AJ stated that any error made by the applicant could only relate to his reasons for the purchasing 
of the property and an error in motive cannot result in the cancellation of a contract. If this was allowed 
the sanctity of the contract would be destroyed by the motives of the parties.10 The error made by the 
applicant was neither an error in corpore or an error in substantia, the latter entitling a party to cancel 
a contract.11 The applicant's error did not relate to the existence of the subject matter of the sale or to 
                                                   
1 Orban v Stead 1978 2 SA 713 (W). 
2 n 1 above. 
3 n 1 above. 
4 n 1 above. 
5 Kerr “Negligent non-disclosure: the duty to call to mind and to disclose” 1979 ALJ 17 AD 18. 
6 n 5 above. 
7 n 5 above. 
8 n 1 above. 
9 n 1 above. 
10 n 1 above. 
11 n 1 above. 
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the quality thereof and there was no suggestion that the respondents fraudulently induced the applicant’s 
error in motive. If this was the case, the applicant’s cause of action would be based on the actio doli.1  
 
King AJ was in agreement with the distinction drawn by Horwitz J in the Cloete case in which the latter 
distinguished between cases involving non-disclosure of latent defects from other cases involving non-
disclosure.2 King AJ found that there is no evidence to justify a finding that the respondents’ silence 
was blameworthy in the sense of being fraudulently purposeful. At most, the applicant has made out a 
case of simple non-disclosure in the sense of inadvertence and this in itself cannot give rise to an action 
based on fraudulent non-disclosure.3 Horwitz J concluded that it is only in a contract of sale where there 
is a duty on a seller having knowledge of a latent defect where a simple non-disclosure amounts to 
fraud.4 
 
2.3.3.1 The duty to call to mind 
 
In dealing with the fact that there was no direct communication between the parties (with reference to 
the case summarised in 2.3.3 above), Kerr considers the following hypothetical scenario.5 Suppose the 
seller had been present when the buyer visited the property and the buyer had said “I see you have a big 
garden extending to the fence down there and that it will be suitable for the purpose I have in mind” 
and the seller genuinely forgetting that erf 163 is leased and not giving any thought to the problem said 
nothing, will this give rise to an action of non-fraudulent non-disclosure, and if so, what remedy is 
available?6 It being remembered that in all contracts good faith is the criterion in evaluating the conduct 
of the parties in the antecedent negotiations, one asks the question: if good faith requires a party to put 
his mind to problems which, in all the circumstances, can fairly be said to present themselves.7 Kerr 
refers to certain passages of Spencer Bower who indicated that in appropriate circumstances there is a 
duty to call to mind and to disclose and that one of the requirements is that the person whose duty to 
disclose is under consideration must have good reason to think that he should give consideration to the 
point in issue.8 Further, it is thought that the duty to call to mind exists only in circumstances in which 
recall is both possible and to be expected.9  
 
 
 
                                                   
1 Orban v Stead 1978 2 SA 713 (W). 
2 n 1 above. 
3 n 1 above. 
4 n 1 above. 
5 Kerr “Negligent non-disclosure: the duty to call to mind and to disclose” 1979 ALJ 17 AD 18. 
6 n 5 above. 
7 n 5 above. 
8 n 5 above. 
9 n 5 above. 
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2.3.4 Absa Bank v Fouche1 
 
The issue in this case was whether the bank had was guilty of negligent or fraudulent non-disclosure 
inducing the appellant to enter into a contract for the hire of a safety deposit box from the bank (the 
safety-deposit box was contained in a safe at the bank).2 The bank’s contract contained a term that the 
appellant bore all risk in respect of the contents of the box.3 Some eight years after the contract was 
entered into, the box and all its contents was stolen. Realising that she did not have a contractual claim, 
the appellant sought delictual damages on the basis of fraudulent non-disclosure and in the alternative, 
a claim based on negligent non-disclosure.4 The appellant was of the view that the bank’s officials did 
not disclose to her the shortcomings in the bank’s security system which is not apparent to a customer 
in that, (a) there was no motion detecting device connected to the alarm and (b) no guard was employed 
to watch over the bank at night.5  
 
Apart from the fact that the bank officials had no duty to disclose (a) and (b) above to the appellant, the 
majority held that: 
 
(i) it is well established that the test for determining wrongfulness in a pre-contractual 
setting is the same as that applied in the case of a non-contractual non-disclosure being, 
the legal convictions of the community;6 
 
(ii) the test to determine the unlawfulness of the non-disclosure (failure to speak) in a 
contractual context has been synthesised into a general test for liability. The test takes 
account of the fact that it is not the norm that one contracting party tell the other party 
all he knows about anything that may be material. That accords with the general rule 
that where conduct takes the form of an omission, such conduct is prima facie lawful. 
A party is expected to speak when the information he has to impart falls within his 
exclusive knowledge and is such that the other party's right to have it communicated to 
him would be mutually recognised by honest men in the circumstances;7 
 
(iii) having established a duty on the defendant to speak, a plaintiff has to prove the further 
elements for an actionable misrepresentation, being that the representation was material 
                                                   
1 ABSA Bank Ltd v Fouche 2003 1 SA 176 (SCA). 
2 n 1 above. 
3 n 1 above. 
4 n 1 above. 
5 n 1 above. 
6 n 1 above. 
7 n 1 above. 
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and it induced the plaintiff to enter into the contract. In the case of fraudulent 
misrepresentation, that must have been the resultant intent of the defendant;1  
 
(iv) exclusive knowledge refers to knowledge that is inaccessible to the point that its 
inaccessibility produced an involuntary reliance on the party possessing the 
information.2 
 
The policy considerations appertaining to the unlawfulness of a failure to speak in a contractual context 
- a non-disclosure - have been synthesised into a general test for liability.3 The test takes account of the 
fact that it is not the norm that one contracting party need to tell the other all he knows about anything 
that may be material.4 That accords with the general rule that where conduct takes the form of an 
omission, such conduct is prima facie lawful.5 A party is expected to speak when the information he 
has to impart falls within his exclusive knowledge (so that in a practical business sense the other party 
has him as his only source) and the information, moreover, is such that the right to have it communicated 
to him would be mutually recognised by honest men in the circumstances.6  
 
The majority found that there was no duty on the branch officials to disclose the absence of an alarm 
and night guard and thus not necessary to decide whether the failure to comply with the duty, had it 
existed, would have been fraudulent or negligent.7 
 
The court explored the contractual and delictual principles regarding non-disclosure and pointed out 
some similarities between the two.8 Recognising that the contractual standard of bona fides and the 
delictual standard of boni mores are both based on ethical considerations, specifically the mores of 
today, the focus when dealing with cases of non-disclosure appears to be on the behaviour expected 
from honest men in the circumstances.9 The reliance on a standard based on what the community views 
as acceptable behaviour seems to suggest that perhaps the distinction between contractual and delictual 
standards used when imposing duties of disclosure is not that clear and that the same test is applied.10 
 
 
 
 
                                                   
1 ABSA Bank Ltd v Fouche 2003 1 SA 176 (SCA). 
2 n 1 above. 
3 n 1 above. 
4 n 1 above. 
5 n 1 above. 
6 n 1 above. 
7 n 1 above. 
8 n 1 above. 
9 n 1 above. 
10 n 1 above. 
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2.3.5 McCann v Goodall1 
 
This matter was an appeal against the judgement of Berman J in terms of which the latter granted the 
claim of the plaintiff (negligent misrepresentation by the defendant). The issue in this case was premised 
on an omission in the form of a non-disclosure in that the defendant had a legal duty to disclose to the 
plaintiff that he was not registered and had breached the duty to disclose by negligently failing to inform 
the plaintiff accordingly.2 This would amount to a negligent misrepresentation in the form of a negligent 
omission to make the said disclosure.3 The plaintiff initially relied on fraudulent misrepresentation by 
the defendant but later amended his claim to make provision for a tacit negligent misrepresentation as 
an alternative cause of action.4 
 
Dealing with the facts of the matter, the South African Revenue Services held the plaintiff liable for the 
payment of general sales tax, penalties and interest because the plaintiff failed to pay general tax on 
motor vehicles sold to the defendant, who was not a registered wholesale trader.5 The plaintiff sought 
to recover the amount paid to the South African Revenue Services as damages from the defendant due 
to his negligent misrepresentation that he was a registered wholesale trader.6 The Defendant, however, 
did not realise that he was obliged to pay general tax if he was not a registered dealer.7 
 
Van Zyl J did not agree with the approach followed by Berman J who held that there could be no 
difference between an express negligent statement and one which was made tacitly or one which 
constitutes a negligent omission to say what should have been said.8 A person who omitted to say 
something which he ought to have said was acting negligently.9 Van Zyl J commented that such 
approach appears to confuse the prerequisites of negligence and wrongfulness (in the first place). The 
breach of a duty establishes wrongfulness whilst negligence is determined objectively or according to 
the standard of the reasonable man.10 Secondly, the concept of misstatement implies that an incorrect 
statement creating misrepresentation was made.11  
 
There is no difference in principle between a misstatement and a non-disclosure as either can create a 
misrepresentation.12 Van Zyl J was of the view that silence cannot constitute a representation nor a 
                                                   
1 McCann v Goodall Group Operations (Pty) Ltd 1995 2 SA 718 (C). 
2 n 1 above. 
3 n 1 above. 
4 n 1 above. 
5 n 1 above. 
6 n 1 above. 
7 n 1 above. 
8 n 1 above. 
9 n 1 above. 
10 n 1 above. 
11 n 1 above. 
12 n 1 above. 
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misrepresentation and referred to certain passages of Kerr which was reconcilable with South African 
law relating to liability for non-disclosure, whether negligent or fraudulent:1 
 
“It is not silence, or reticence, which in itself can amount to a misrepresentation. It must be concealment, 
or suppressio veri and these terms import the existence of a duty. A man cannot be said to conceal what he is not 
bound to reveal, suppress what he is under no duty to express, or keep back what he is not required to put forward. 
There must be a duty of some sort to speak, arising out of the circumstances, in accordance with the principles set 
out in the text, before the representee can legally complain of the representor's silence. Tacit acquiescence in the 
self-delusion of another, if nothing is said or done to mislead, or silence which does not make that which is stated 
false, draws with it no legal liability.”2 
 
Van Zyl said that a negligent misrepresentation by way of an omission may occur in the form of a non-
disclosure when there is a breach of a legal duty resting on one contracting party to disclose material 
facts to the other contracting party.3 A duty to disclose is said to arise when there is an involuntary 
reliance of the one party on the frank disclosure of certain facts within the exclusive knowledge of the 
other such that, in fair dealing, the former's right to have such information communicated to him would 
be mutually recognised by honest men in the circumstances.4 There is no such duty where matters are 
equally open to common observation, or ascertainable by ordinary diligence, or accessible to both 
parties alike.5 Christie, however, argues that to expect a party to speak in such circumstances would 
extend the duty of disclosure beyond the involuntary reliance situation into unchartered territory.6 He 
also warns that silence may amount to a misrepresentation in some cases.7 There is no general rule in 
our law that all material facts must be disclosed and that non-disclosure amount to misrepresentation 
by silence.8 In certain circumstances this is the rule such as contracts which are uberrima fides because 
the duty of disclosure is ex lege and not because any higher degree of faith is required.9 
 
Van Zyl held that the plaintiff failed to prove that the defendant had any knowledge of his obligation to 
pay general sales tax and they clearly did not rely, involuntarily or otherwise, on any frank disclosure 
by the defendant in this regard. As such, the plaintiff was responsible for his own loss as there was no 
legal duty on the defendant to disclose to the plaintiff that he was not a registered dealer.10 
 
 
 
 
                                                   
1 McCann v Goodall Group Operations (Pty) Ltd 1995 2 SA 718 (C). 
2 n 1 above. 
3 n 1 above. 
4 n 1 above. 
5 n 1 above. 
6 Christie The Law of Contract in South Africa (6th ed) 287. 
7 n 6 above. 
8 n 6 above. 
9 n 6 above. 
10 n 1 above. 
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2.4 The common law duty of disclosure 
 
Nortje has summarised some of the common law grounds for the existence of a duty of disclosure during 
pre-contractual negotiations as follows: 1 
 
(a) the insured has a duty to disclose material information in contracts of insurance;2 
 
(b) in contracts between parties in a fiduciary relationship, including partnership and agency 
contracts;3 
 
(c) a seller has a duty to disclose latent redhibitory defects of which he is aware;4 
 
(d) a seller has a duty to disclose unusual or unexpected circumstances or qualities of a merx, even 
if such does not constitute a redhibitory defect;5 
 
(e) where a misrepresentor makes a positive representation that is true but it creates a false 
impression because it is an incomplete statement of the facts;6 
 
(f) where a misrepresentor made a positive statement which was true at the time it was made but 
subsequently becomes untrue as a result changing circumstances as well as possibly those cases 
where a party makes a statement without realising that it is untrue but subsequently becomes 
aware of its incorrectness;7 
 
(g) disclosures of some facts in engagement contracts;8 
 
(h) an insolvent has a duty to disclose his insolvency (although this rule is apparently not 
invariable);9 
 
(i) prospective employees have a duty to disclose relevant information regarding their previous 
employment or criminal history;10 
 
                                                   
1 Nortje “Pre-contractual duties of disclosure in the South African common law (part 1)” 2015 TSAR 347. 
2 n 1 above. 
3 n 1 above. 
4 n 1 above. 
5 n 1 above. 
6 n 1 above. 
7 n 1 above. 
8 n 1 above. 
9 n 1 above. 
10 n 1 above. 
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(j) situations where the information falls within the exclusive knowledge of one party and the legal 
convictions of the community would require disclosure;1 
 
(k) if a party has knowledge of certain unusual characteristics relating to or circumstances 
surrounding a transaction and policy considerations require that the other party be apprised 
thereof;2 and 
 
(l) if a previous statement or representation of a party was vague and which requires to be 
supplemented.3 
 
However, Van Zyl J stated in McCann that the above examples are not a numerus clausus of the 
occurrence of a duty to disclose and that certain factors have come to the fore over time which may 
indicate the existence of a legal duty to act positively to prevent harm.4 
 
2.5 Materiality, involuntary reliance and recognition by honest men 
 
Nortje has identified certain threshold requirements (as she refers to them) that must be met for a duty 
of disclosure to arise as there is no general duty in South African law to disclose information to the 
other party.5 These are: 
 
(i) an ignorance of the information or its significance by the misrepresentee;6  
 
(ii) subjective inducement, in the sense that the misrepresentor would not have contracted on 
the terms that he did if the information had been disclosed to him;7  
 
(iii) actual knowledge of the information or its significance by the misrepresentor;8 
 
(iv) the materiality of the non-disclosure;9 and possibly  
 
(v) fault on the part of the misrepresentor.10 
 
                                                   
1 McCann v Goodall Group Operations (Pty) Ltd 1995 2 SA 718 (C). 
2 n 1 above. 
3 n 1 above. 
4 n 1 above. 
5 Nortje “Pre-contractual duties of disclosure in the South African common law (part 1)” 2015 TSAR 347.  
6 n 5 above.  
7 n 5 above.  
8 n 5 above.  
9 n 5 above.  
10 n 5 above.  
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As was stated in the ABSA Bank case, the duty to disclose arises only where information falls within 
the exclusive knowledge of a party and is such that the other party's right to know it would in the 
relevant circumstances be recognised by honest men.1 In addition, the information should be 
inaccessible to the point that the other contracting party involuntary relies on the party possessing the 
information to disclose it.2 
  
2.5.1 Materiality 
 
The materiality of the information is quite important as according to Nortje it has two functions, namely, 
it sets boundaries for liability for misrepresentation to instances where inducement is objectively 
foreseeable and secondly, it serves to sanction unreasonable reliance on a misrepresentation by the 
misrepresentee.3 However, it must not be forgotten that the requirement of materiality entails 
foreseeability of inducement (albeit from a purely objective viewpoint, as opposed to a subjective-
objective viewpoint employed for purposes of fault).4  
 
2.5.2 Involuntary reliance 
 
The dominant view is that a pre-contractual duty of disclosure is premised on a single unifying concept 
of involuntary reliance. However, the decision in the ABSA Bank case implied a narrower view in that 
the duty is confined to instances of exclusive knowledge.5 Nortje seems to reckon that the court may 
have inadvertently combined the two concepts as later in the decision it referred to the wider concept 
of involuntary reliance.6 
 
According to Millner, the point of departure in South African law is that each party should acquire the 
relevant information himself and that the common law duties of disclosure are confined to instances of 
involuntary reliance where the misrepresentee was unable to safeguard his interests and therefore has 
to rely on disclosure by the other party.7 Millner is of the view that this applies in two scenarios, namely: 
 
(i) the information is not reasonably accessible to the misrepresentee. Although there is not 
much authority on this point, it appears that inaccessibility is generally based on an 
objective test (if the information is accessible to an ordinary person with average abilities 
and experience;8 and 
                                                   
1 ABSA Bank Ltd v Fouche 2003 1 SA 176 (SCA). 
2 n 1 above. 
3 Nortje “Pre-contractual duties of disclosure in the South African common law (part 1)” 2015 TSAR 347. 
4 n 3 above. 
5 n 1 above.  
6 n 3 above. 
7 n 3 above. 
8 n 3 above.  
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(ii) the parties are in a relationship of trust or influence, in which case the misrepresentee is 
unable independently to protect his own interests due to the nature of the relationship.1 
 
An approach based on involuntary reliance implies a very limited scope for the imposition of a duty of 
disclosure outside the established grounds (as referred to at 2.4 above). In terms of this approach, 
expansion to novel grounds would be confined to instances where the misrepresentee was reasonably 
unable to protect his own interests by acquiring the information.2 Apart from novel situations of 
exclusive knowledge, the only other possibility for expansion would be relationships of trust and 
influence which is not currently covered by the established grounds.3 As to novel situations of exclusive 
knowledge, it is true that the test of reasonable accessibility gives a court some leeway to mitigate the 
restrictive effect of the involuntary reliance requirement.4 However, the fact that accessibility is tested 
objectively means that courts do not take account of real, but subjective barriers to the misrepresentee’s 
ability to acquire the information.5 Even if the information is reasonably inaccessible, liability does not 
necessarily follow, since, in addition, the circumstances of the case must be such that the right to 
disclosure would be mutually recognised by honest men, which will be discussed further below.6 
 
2.5.3 Recognised by honest men 
 
This entails a normative judgment as honest men are defined as persons embodying the legal convictions 
of the community.7 Although the word implies morality, it is submitted that not too much emphasis 
should be placed on this aspect given our courts’ view that private morality does not translate to legal 
duties.8 This criterion is closely related to Millner’s concept of ordinary standards of fair dealing. As 
such, it reflects a mixture of ethical and commercial standards, which sometimes allow one party to 
take advantage of the other’s ignorance, despite the general norm of good faith underlying contract 
law.9  
 
 
 
 
 
                                                   
1 Nortje “Pre-contractual duties of disclosure in the South African common law (part 1)” 2015 TSAR 347. 
2 n 1 above. 
3 n 1 above. 
4 n 1 above 
5 n 1 above 
6 n 1 above. 
7 n 1 above. 
8 n 1 above. 
9 n 1 above. 
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CHAPTER 3 
LIABILITY, REMEDIES AND EXEMPTION OF LIABILITY  
 
3. Introduction 
 
This chapter analyses the various forms of liability that could arise for failing to speak up (specifically 
with reference to the findings of the court summarised above) in circumstances where this duty existed. 
It also touches on the point of how liability for pre-contractual non-disclosure can be dealt with 
contractually and briefly addresses the remedies available to a party for such breach and whether it is 
possible to exempt liable for non-disclosure.   
  
3.1 Liability 
 
3.1.1 Liability for fraudulent non-disclosure 
 
In the Cloete case Horwitz J referred to the decision of Selke J in the Knight case (which endorsed the 
view that deliberate concealment is fraudulent) that a seller may be held liable where he designedly 
conceals the existence of defects from the purchaser or craftily refrains from informing him thereof.1 In 
those circumstances, the seller’s liability is contingent on him having behaved in a manner which 
amounts to a fraud on the purchaser and it would thus follow that in order for the purchaser to hold the 
seller liable he must show directly or by inference that the seller actually knew of the defects. In general, 
ignorance due to mere negligence is not equivalent to fraud.2 It is thus clear that material non-disclosure 
is not actionable as fraud unless it is tainted with bad faith but this does not necessarily mean that silence 
of a material fact, if its purpose is to induce a contract, must be stigmatized as bad faith.3 
 
Also, the need to show fraudulent design was emphasized in the Dibley case where van Zyl J stated 
that:  
“…mere non-disclosure of a defect does not in itself give rise to an action for fraud. The knowledge of the defect 
must be withheld with the object of inducing the other party to enter into the contract or with the object of concealing 
facts, the knowledge of which is calculated to induce the other party to refrain from entering into the contract. That 
the element of dolus is an essential for this form of action need not be stressed.”4 
 
In the Waller case the plaintiffs averred that despite a voetstoots clause the defendants had a duty to 
disclose the existence of latent defects in the property of which they were aware at the time of the sale.5 
                                                   
1 Knight v Trollip 1948 3 SA 1009 (N). 
2 n 1 above.  
3 Dibley v Furter 1951 4 SA 73 (C). 
4 n 3 above. 
5 Waller and Another v Pienaar and Another 2004 6 SA 303 (C). 
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In voetstoots sales when a thing is sold as it is, a seller's liability is excluded in respect of all defects in 
the thing of which he or she was genuinely ignorant up to and at the time of the sale.1 A seller will also  
not be liable for defects which were clearly visible or patent.2 The exception to this is where it was 
concluded that the seller will not be able to rely on the protection of a voetstoots clause where, having 
sold voetstoots, the seller was aware of the defects at the time of making the contract and dolo malo 
concealed the existence of the defects with the intention of defrauding the purchaser.3 The seller in these 
circumstances is clearly under a duty to disclose to the purchaser defects of which he or she is aware, 
and the purchaser has a remedy if the seller has acted fraudulently. For a plaintiff to succeed with a 
claim, he or she must prove that (i) the defendants were aware of the defects at the time of sale, (ii) the 
defendants had a duty to disclose the existence of the defects to Plaintiffs at the time of sale and (iii) 
the defendants fraudulently concealed the existence of the defects, thereby inducing the contract, 
alternatively that defendants fraudulently misrepresented that there were no defects.4 
 
Savage AJ confirmed in Mottel that non-disclosure of a fact is fraudulent if the guilty party foresees the 
possibility that failure to disclose it will cause harm to the other party.5 
 
In the Hain & Son matter the defendant failed to inform the plaintiff of the quality of the coal in that it 
was totally unfit and unsuitable for its intended purpose.6 In this matter Bale CJ declared that the actio 
ex empto afforded relief in respect of defects only if the seller had given a warranty or when he, knowing 
of the defect, had deliberately kept quiet about it.7 To support his view he referred to Moyle’s statement 
that the actio redhibitoria and quanti minoris may be used in cases of fraud (including wilful non-
disclosure), warranty or representation in which the purchaser could previously have resorted to 
the actio ex empto.8 Dishonesty is the main element in dolus and it is not the effect of the deception that 
gives rise to a cause of action in fraud.9 Deception could result from some innocent cause. It is when 
the deception results from the deceitfulness of the guilty party that a cause of action in fraud can be 
founded.10 
 
It is thus clear from the above that a party can be held liable where he deliberately conceals information, 
of which he is aware and the other party not, with the intention of inducing the other party to enter into 
the contract.  
 
                                                   
1 Waller and Another v Pienaar and Another 2004 6 SA 303 (C). 
2 n 1 above. 
3 n 1 above. 
4 n 1 above.  
5 Mottell v Altmarr Properties case no 19479/12 (C) (unreported). 
6 Hain & Son v Elandslaagte Colliery Co Ltd and Young 1903 24 NLR 363. 
7 n 6 above. 
8 n 6 above. 
9 n 6 above. 
10 n 6 above. 
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3.1.2 Liability for negligent non-disclosure 
 
Considering damages for negligent non-disclosure Wessels AJ referred to the Hamman case.1 Although 
logic and the never-ending development of legal ideas do not appear to be opposed to a conclusion that 
in appropriate circumstances an action to recover pecuniary losses caused by honest but carelessly made 
misrepresentations might be maintained, there is no authoritative determination or acceptable definition 
in our law of the principles to be applied in deciding in what circumstances such an action will lie.2 The 
practical difficulties in any general and unqualified extension of the principles of negligence, as applied 
to negligent conduct causing injury, to honest but carelessly made misrepresentations causing pecuniary 
loss was mentioned in Herschel and is summarised below:3 
 
(i) the law of negligence should not be allowed unnecessarily to invade areas that are already 
fully and satisfactorily dealt with by other legal rules;4 
 
(ii) it cannot be argued that every ill-considered answer to an apparently unimportant question 
should involve the answerer in liability if carelessly mistaken to make good the inquirer's 
loss, even though a reasonable person may weigh his words prudently and bear in mind the 
possibility that if he is not careful his answer may contain mistakes and cause harm;5 
 
(iii) liability for answers to questions arise only where there is a duty to give the correct 
information.6 This involves many considerations like there must be knowledge that the 
information is desired for a serious purpose and that the party to whom it is given intends 
to rely and act upon it; that, if false or incorrect, such person will suffer harm;7 
 
(iv) the relationship of the parties must be such that the one has the right to rely upon the other 
for information and the one giving the information owes a duty to give it with care. In view 
of the complexity of modern business, each case must be decided on the peculiar facts 
presented;8 
 
(v) at common law nobody is obliged to guard against a danger which has been created by the 
conduct of others.9 
                                                   
1 Hamman v Moolman 1968 4 SA 340 (A). 
2 n 1 above. 
3 Herschel v Mrupe 1954 3 SA 464 (A). 
4 n 3 above. 
5 n 3 above. 
6 n 3 above. 
7 n 3 above. 
8 n 3 above. 
9 n 3 above. 
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The basis of our law relating to redress for damage flowing from the negligence of others is the aquilian 
action and before a party can succeed which such action, he or she must show that it has 
suffered damnum injuria datum at the hands of the other.1 
 
Millner states that if there are cases where fraudulent non-disclosure is actionable under the lex aquilia, 
one might argue that negligent non-disclosure would be actionable too, for culpa and dolus grounds an 
aquilian action.2 In the Herscel case the court recognised that in a proper case an action for damages 
might lie in respect of a careless misrepresentation ut arguments from principle have their limitations, 
and so gingerly was this question of negligent statements handled by the learned judges of appeal that 
its alter ego, negligent concealment or non-disclosure, must tremble before knocking on the door of that 
august forum.3 
 
In the ABSA case, the court isolated a few principles relating to negligent non-disclosure / 
misrepresentation: 4 
 
(i) it may give rise to delictual liability and to a claim for damages if the prerequisites for 
delictual liability are met;5 
 
(ii) it may be constituted by an omission provided the defendant breached a legal duty 
established by policy considerations to act positively in order to prevent harm;6 
 
(iii) a negligent misrepresentation by way of an omission may occur in the form of a non-
disclosure where there is a legal duty on a party to disclose some or other material fact and 
he fails to do so;7 
 
(iv) silence or inaction cannot constitute a misrepresentation of any kind unless there is a duty 
to speak or act.8 
 
Steyn dealt with the issue as to what our law requires to be proved in order to establish liability for 
damages for negligent non-disclosure.9 According to him the position was clearly stated by the court in 
the case of Bayer. A delictual action for damages is available to a plaintiff who can establish (i) that the 
                                                   
1 Herschel v Mrupe 1954 3 SA 464 (A). 
2 Millner “Fraudulent non-disclosure” 1957 SALJ 157 200. 
3 n 1 above. 
4 ABSA Bank Ltd v Fouche 2003 1 SA 176 (SCA). 
5 n 4 above. 
6 n 4 above. 
7 n 4 above. 
8 n 4 above. 
9 Steyn “Damages for negligent non-disclosure by one contracting party to the other: the requirements for liability” 2003 SALJ 465. 
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defendant made a misstatement to the plaintiff; (ii) that in making this misstatement the person acted 
(a) negligently and (b) unlawfully; (iii) that the misstatement caused the plaintiff to sustain loss; and 
(iv) that the damages claimed represent proper compensation for such loss.1 In principle Steyn can see 
no good reason why in the recognition of such a cause of action based upon a negligent misstatement 
any distinction should be drawn between a misstatement made which induces a contract and one made 
outside the contractual sphere.2 In principle a negligent misstatement may, depending on the 
circumstances, give rise to a delictual claim for damages at the suit of the person to whom it was made, 
even though the misstatement induced such person to enter into a contract with the party who made it.3 
The circumstances will determine the vital issues of unlawfulness and whether there is a causal 
connection between the making of the misstatement and the loss suffered by the plaintiff. In light hereof, 
it is clear that the requirements for delictual liability in terms of the lex aquilia, namely, (1) unlawful 
(2) conduct, committed with (3) fault (in the form of either intention or negligence) on the part of the 
defendant, which (4) caused (5) patrimonial loss, must be proved for the plaintiff to succeed in a claim 
for damages in circumstances such as those in the ABSA Bank case. While proof is required that the 
misrepresentation caused the plaintiff's loss, Steyn submits that it is unnecessary for the plaintiff to 
show that the misrepresentation induced the contract.4 
 
4. Remedies 
 
4.1 Estoppel 
 
There are two main classes of estoppel, namely estoppel by representation and estoppel per rem 
judicatum.5 Estoppel by representation comprises all the rules of evidence, the common one being that 
any litigant is debarred from contradicting any representation previously made by him to the other party 
with the object and result of inducing him to alter his position to his detriment.6 Estoppel per rem 
judicatum is not relevant for purposes of his research. 
 
In order to found an estoppel, the representation must be precise and unambiguous.7 Trollip J in the 
Electrolux (Pty) Ltd v Khota matter said that generally and logically the first enquiry should be into 
what was the specific conduct of the party that the respondent relied upon for the estoppel. If that 
conduct is not such as would in the eyes of a reasonable person, in the same position as the respondent, 
constitute a representation, then cadit quaestio - no estoppel can arise. If such conduct does beget that 
                                                   
1 Steyn “Damages for negligent non-disclosure by one contracting party to the other: the requirements for liability” 2003 SALJ 465. 
2 n 1 above. 
3 n 1 above. 
4 n 1 above. 
5 Spencer Bower The law relating to estoppel by representation (1923) 1. 
6 n 5 above. 
7 Concor Holdings (Pty) Ltd t/a Concor Technicrete v Potgieter 2004 6 SA 491 (SCA). 
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representation, then the next enquiry would logically be whether the respondent relied upon, or was 
misled by, that representation.1 
 
A successful defence of estoppel must show that (i) there has been a representation by the representor, 
(ii) which it to the detriment of the representee and (ii) there is a causal relationship between the 
representation and the detriment.2 
 
Myburgh argues that sometimes it would be in the public interest to allow estoppel to operate so that, 
indirectly, effect is given to a formally invalid agreement. She bases her argument on Gerhard Lubbe's 
proposition that public policy and private law in general is based on competing values or principles 
which must be weighed against each other in order to reach a fair outcome in a particular situation.3 
Myburgh refers to Lubbe’s comments in this regard: 
 
“a [v]iew of private law unequivocally shows that the principle of autonomy is not the only relevant principle. Our 
law recognizes multiple, competing principles and policy factors that, in addition to the principle of autonomy, act 
as determinants of legal rules and institutions… in a particular case may indicate the same legal consequence, it will 
often happen that they conflict with each other and prescribe different legal consequences ... Conflicting or 
competing principles must be taken into account in relation to the establishment of legal rules and institutions and 
develop considerations and rules and concepts that express this value system.”4 
 
Although this view was expressed as a prelude to explaining why fault may sometimes be required for 
a successful reliance on the defence of estoppel, it is broad enough also to suggest an approach to dealing 
with the other requirements for the operation of estoppel, including the rule that estoppel should not 
succeed where this would be contrary to public policy.5  
 
The relevance of this defence is that misrepresentor is estopped from denying the truth of the 
representation, whether fraudulent or negligent, and which was acted upon by the misrepresentee to his 
detriment.   
 
4.2 Damages 
 
In the McCann case the majority held that a negligent misrepresentation may give rise to delictual 
liability and to a claim for damages, provided the prerequisites for such liability are complied with.6 
                                                   
1 Concor Holdings (Pty) Ltd t/a Concor Technicrete v Potgieter 2004 6 SA 491 (SCA). 
2 Myburgh “On constitutive formalities, estoppel and breaking the rules” 2016 Stell LR 254. 
3 n 2 above. 
4 n 2 above. 
5 n 2 above. 
6 Steyn “Damages for negligent non-disclosure by one contracting party to the other: the requirements for liability” 2003 SALJ 465. 
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In determining if damages would be given for negligent non-disclosure, Kerr states that attention may 
be drawn to judgement of the Hamman case.1 In this matter the plaintiff claimed damages based upon 
negligent representations made by the defendant in relation to a piece of land and inducing the contract.2 
Prior to signing the deed of sale the defendant represented to the plaintiff that the area of the immovable 
property included a swimming pool, barbecue and garden.3 These representations were false in that the 
immovable property did not include the swimming pool, barbecue and garden.4 The plaintiff alleged 
that the defendant owed him a duty of care not to misrepresent the boundaries of the property and in 
breach of that duty, made the representations negligently.5 The representations were material and made 
with the intention of inducing the plaintiff to enter into the agreement.6 The plaintiff had to prove that 
the defendants had no honest belief in the truth of their statements.7 Addressing the second part of the 
plaintiff’s claim, Wessels AJ stated that existing laws grants adequate protection in the field of contract 
to a party to whom a misrepresentation was made.8 A contracting party may safeguard himself against 
loss by simply requiring the representor to guarantee the truth of his representation.9 Wessels concluded 
that even if it were to be assumed in favour of the plaintiff that a claim based upon negligence was 
available to him, it could not succeed on the facts because the evidence did not establish negligence on 
the part of the seller.10 
 
As was confirmed in the Natal Administrators case, our law recognises a delictual action for damages 
based upon a negligent misstatement which causes purely economic loss.11 
 
4.3 Cancellation 
 
Although there is no clear authority in South African law on this point, it is suggested that there is good 
reason for the recognition of a cause of action on negligent non-disclosure giving rise to a remedy of 
cancellation.12 Non-disclosure is closely related to misrepresentation and it is clear that cancellation is 
competent in the case of negligent misrepresentation.13 The comparison is with negligent 
misrepresentation, rather than the simple misrepresentation, as the duty to disclose is based on the fact 
that the knowledge could have and have been called to min.14 Failure to call it to mind is failure to act 
                                                   
1 Hamman v Moolman 1968 4 SA 340 (A). 
2 n 1 above. 
3 n 1 above. 
4 n 1 above 
5 n 1 above 
6 n 1 above. 
7 n 1 above. 
8 n 1 above. 
9 n 1 above. 
10 n 1 above. 
11 Bayer South Africa (Pty) Ltd v Frost 1991 4 SA 559 (A). 
12 Kerr “Negligent non-disclosure: the duty to call to mind and to disclose” 1979 ALJ 17 AD 18. 
13 n 12 above. 
14 n 12 above. 
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as a bonus paterfamilias would act and this failure may be considered as negligence. On this argument 
nothing stands in the way of cancellation as a remedy.1 
 
Bayer South Africa (Pty) Ltd v Frost finally demonstrated that a person who induces another to enter 
into a contract by making a negligent misstatement may not only face the avoidance of the contract, but 
also be liable to the other party for loss he suffers in consequence. However, negligence alone is not 
enough. The party induced must also establish unlawfulness, which means proving that there was a duty 
to speak.2 
 
Spencer Bower is also of the opinion that cancellation may be available as a remedy when a duty to 
disclose has been breached.3 He notes at the same time that damages for fraud is not in issue.4 The 
reason why there is so little South African law on this point seems to be that most cases of non-
disclosure are on sale.5 In sales the majority of cases which might give rise to questions of non-
fraudulent non-disclosure also give rise to aedilitian remedies.6 These remedies do not require 
knowledge of any kind to be shown, neither knowledge present to the mind of the party in question, nor 
knowledge of what once was known and could be recalled if necessary.7 Hence, it rarely happens that 
there is need to ask whether a forgotten circumstance could and ought to have been called to mind, and, 
if so, whether, failing disclosure, cancellation is competent.8 The facts in this case show that the question 
may occasionally arise. In the absence of clear authority in South African law, it is suggested that there 
is good reason for recognition of a cause of action on negligent non-disclosure giving rise to the remedy 
of cancellation.9 
 
5. Exempting liability 
 
Exemption clauses are terms which are normally incorporated into standard form contracts to exclude 
a duty or liability which the law would otherwise attach to such a person.10 In principle, exemption 
clauses are enforceable in South Africa if the parties have agreed to them and they are not contrary to 
public policy, in which case, they will be struck down by the courts.11 At the same token, a person 
cannot escape liability for fraudulent or dishonest conduct by inserting an exemption clause in a contract 
as such clause is contrary to public policy and will be void.12 
                                                   
1 Kerr “Negligent non-disclosure: the duty to call to mind and to disclose” 1979 ALJ 17 AD 18. 
2 ABSA Bank Ltd v Fouche 2003 1 SA 176 (SCA). 
3 n 1 above. 
4 n 1 above. 
5 n 1 above. 
6 n 1 above. 
7 n 1 above. 
8 n 1 above. 
9 n 1 above. 
10 Kanamugire “The current status of exemption clauses in the South African law of contract” 2014 MCSER 164. 
11 n 10 above. 
12 n 10 above. 
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Some legal writers have, in the past, held the view that although a contracting party may, validly, 
contractually exclude liability for ordinarily negligence, the same cannot validly be executed for gross 
negligence and dolus.1 A clause which attempts to do so is null and void and against public policy. 
Others writers have taken an opposing view.2 Despite some uncertainty which existed in legal thinking, 
it is fairly settled amongst legal writers that a clause excluding liability for dolus (wilful conduct) or 
fraud is against public policy and void, and so is a clause which excludes liability for an intentional 
breach of contract.3 A clause excluding liability for ordinary and gross negligence (culpa lata) is, on 
the other hand, not against public policy.4  
 
Limits have been set to exemptions permitted, by interpreting exemption clauses narrowly.5 In 
interpreting such clauses, what needs to be done, first and foremost, is to examine the nature of the 
contract in order to decide what legal grounds of liability would exist in the absence of the clause, for 
instance strict liability, negligence or gross negligence.6 The clause will then be given the minimum of 
effectiveness by being interpreted to exempt the party concerned only from the ground of liability for 
which he would otherwise be liable.7 This involves the least degree of blameworthiness.8 Where there 
is doubt, the writers have suggested, that such a clause should be construed against the proferens.9 
 
Millner10 stated that in the case of active concealment, designed concealment and simple non-disclosure, 
the conduct constitutes fraud with the result that the party guilty of it may not contract himself out of 
liability whether by a voetstoots clause or otherwise. This was also confirmed in the Wells case that a 
party cannot contract out of liability for fraudulent conduct.11 
 
The same principle was followed in the du Toit case where van Heerden AJ confirmed, in the context 
of an exemption clause, that:  
 
“In my opinion, any behaviour by words or conduct is sufficient to be a misrepresentation if it is such as to mislead 
the other party about the existence or extent of the exemption. If it conveys a false impression, that is enough. If the 
false impression is created knowingly, it is a fraudulent misrepresentation; if it is created unwittingly, it is an innocent 
misrepresentation. Either is sufficient to disentitle the creator of it to the benefit of the exemption.”  12 
 
                                                   
1 Lerm A critical analysis of exclusionary clauses in medical contracts (2009 thesis SA) 808. 
2 n 1 above. 
3 n 1 above. 
4 n 1 above. 
5 n 1 above. 
6 n 1 above. 
7 n 1 above. 
8 n 1 above. 
9 n 1 above. 
10 Millner “Fraudulent non-disclosure” 1957 SALJ 157 200. 
11 Wells v South African Alumenite Co 1927 AD 69; Chadwick “Contracting out of liability for gross negligence” De Rebus (2012) § 34. 
12 Du Toit v Atkinson’s Motors Bpk 1985 2 All SA 149 (A). 
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As such, parties may contractually exempt their liability for negligent non-disclosure in. The same 
cannot be said of fraudulent non-disclosure as there is considerable case law available which invalidate 
such clauses.  
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CHAPTER 4 
CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
 
It seems that the duty of disclosure is dependent upon two main factors, namely the materiality of the 
information and whether it is within the exclusive knowledge (not easily accessible to the other 
contracting party) of a party. The text distinguishes between fraudulent non-disclosure, a deliberate 
intent to conceal information to induce a party to enter into a contract and negligent non-disclosure / 
misstatement / simple non-disclosure. It is evident that silence cannot be regarded as fraudulent and a 
person’s intentions and conscious knowledge of information not readily to the other party, remains the 
determining factor for fraud.  
 
Liability for pre-contractual non-disclosures are twofold. If the duty is established and depending on 
the type of non-disclosure, the elements relevant to form of liability (i.e. fraud or negligence) must be 
proven. In the case of negligent non-disclosure, unlawfulness also plays a role and this is determined 
based upon the legal convictions of the community. In my view, it is open to the parties to include 
contractual terms regulating their liability for pre-contractual misstatements. Fraudulent inducement 
goes without saying as that the contract void.  
 
It is suggested that the remedies be clearly outlined in a written contract preceding the negotiations so 
as to avoid any loopholes available to a party responsible for the breach of the duty.  
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